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PHILOSOPHICALLY, THERE IS A NECESSARY NEXUS BETWEEN BEING AS THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT: This paper looks at the question of validity and justification of knowledge from the perspective that without being there can be no knowledge in the first place. It advances an argument that being is a condition sine qua non for any knowledge's theory. The paper looks through problem under investigation through Kantian epistemology as contained largely his Critique of Pure Reason which is adequate response and resounding agreement and disagreement with the rationalists in their assertions and negations.

Keywords- Being, Empiricism, Knowledge, Object, Rationalism, Subject.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper proceeds by looking at the response offered to the irreconcilable differences between the empiricists and the rationalists as contained in the Critiques of Pure Reason authored by Kant. After acknowledging and bringing to the fore the critical issues contained in the analysis by Kant in which he both agrees with the assertions and disagrees with both in their negations, it goes further and uniquely advances the view that the knowledge that we actually seek to validate depends on the existence of being in the first place.

II. KANT'S CONTRIBUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE

Through his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant aimed at addressing the epistemological challenge posed by empiricism and rationalism. In line with the philosophical *principle nihil est in intellectu nisi prius in sensibus fuerat* meaning that nothing is in the intellect unless it was first received or facilitated by the senses (Aristotle), Kant's begins his epistemic questioning with the matters either experienced or observed. Kant notably agrees with both the empiricists who assert that knowledge is *aposteriori* and rationalists who hold that knowledge is *apriori*. He further disagrees with both the rationalists and empiricists in what they negate, he affirms that the rationalists were wrong to deny that knowledge cannot be acquire *aposteriori* and equally disagrees with the rationalists in holding that knowledge cannot be *apriori*.

Apriori understanding not only comprises metaphysics but also all expertise, such as psychology and metaphysics, which is autonomous of experience. This implies that the non-material beings are also *apriori*. The idea that pure elements of expertise are valid can be explained by saying that in transcendental deductions and critiques they make ordinary empirical experiences possible. Something possible must meet the conditions required for its existence, in other words, it must have sufficient conditions for it to be.

Questioning how a thing is an attempt to understand how it exists, interpret and relate to its occurrence. This can be achieved by first showing or highlighting observable real events to demonstrate that these occurrences require interpretation and then contend for the finest possible answer. Once we have excellent reasons to accept some reasoning, we can derive logical findings from our theoretical ideas.

Knowledge should and always be the climax and the apex of intuitions and ideas and the collaboration between sense and comprehension, which is needed as such. This is affirmed by Hartnack when he opines as follows:

What is not conceptualized (that is, not understood through concept means), and does not emerge in time and space, does not, as Kant suggests, satisfy the needed requirements of being known. It cannot only be thought and understood (and hence not conversed about); it cannot even be said to exist.

Hartnack alludes to the fact that according to Kant knowledge must be of something that exists and confirming the necessary nexus between epistemology and metaphysics, and as we saw earlier the denial of the possibility of metaphysics by Kant as he has been understood by some scholars is apparent. We have also seen that there are some abstract ideas, which do not occur from knowledge outcomes, but rather from circumstances of knowledge. Strawson says the following in regards to this:

It is as if there is no manner to instantiate thoughts in your knowledge except if you are aware of your cases in moment and room. As a result time and room are merely types of a person's sensitivity that are regarded in us as an individual aware of multiple items that can be introduced into ideas.

III. EXISTENCE PRECEDES KNOWLEDGE

Thought with no content is hollow and; intuition with no concept is visionless (*Gedanken ohne inhalt sind leer; anschauungen ohne begriffe sind blind.*) This statement asserts the contrast between intuition and concept but their difference establishes a unified whole when the process of knowing is undertaken. This implies that understanding is a mixture of ideas and intuitions. One may not claim to have knowledge in the absence of either thoughts or intuitions. If we think without content, we examine ideas, and yet we understand that learning includes something that happens and that the sensations provide. As stated bellow, our knowledge results from existence of being:

Two different perception modes: causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. Presentational immediacy is focused on the perceptions of the elements of senses such as size, colour, and shape. The term presentational immediacy is used about the immediate impression of the contemporary outside world via which a person's causal efficacy and senses give a picture of objects as affecting him or her or in other words, and it gives the person a general sense of existence. What we do not fully understand, however, in the causal efficacy.

Thinking is not equivalent to knowing because it is possible to think without content and cannot say that we understand, it's wrong to take the perspective we understand by simply imagining. Although the emotions are not thinking, the perception is sensitive, an aesthetic and a logical interpretation must develop knowledge, because neither of them is capable of producing only knowledge. The role of positive sciences is implied when we talk at the level of knowing as distinguished from thinking as an activity.

Without a synthesis of what has been received temporally and conceptually, it would be unimaginable to think of knowledge. We can claim that through sensibility and comprehension we are willing to understand through intuition and reflection; moreover we can tell that it also involves and inherently also proves the presence of what we know every moment we speak about knowing. It is never an option to negate the existence of the known.

To think or to intuit is never exclusively applicable and no epistemologist worth their salt in the modern day may hold such a view without being unfair to the analysis made herein. This does not imply that one is secondary than neither intuition nor thinking is superior to the other. Both are essential for the reason that neither of them on their own without the aid of another can yield to knowledge. Wisdom comprises intuitions and ideas of room, moment and categories, or their mere shapes.

There being no unique differentiation between responsiveness and comprehension, it calls for a deeper reflection to justify the possibility of knowledge. The separation of the two faculties is for the purpose of systematically and critically examining what is received through sensibility and what is intuited. In practice it may not always be the case that one faculty is exclusively useful in resolving challenges in life that require human knowledge to address.

IV. A PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION OF WHETHER KNOWLEDGE CAN BE ACHIEVED BY UNDERSTANDING HOW THE SUBJECT RELATES WITH THE OBJECT

The relationship between the object of knowledge and the subject remains central if we must find that which we can present as justified true belief. We must then find the components of knowledge-situation with respect to subjective and objective knowledge. The theory of representative found considerable support among other philosophers who used it to advance Critical Realism.

One may hold that that in the absence of the observational perceiver and active awareness in the object perceived, the object of perception would be as good as moot and existentially valueless, which may not be entirely without merit or value if examined critically. The question therefore is, can an object exist or claim to exist without some kind of mental animadversion? Answering this question in the affirmative or negative would raise critical and worth philosophical issues worth our attention.

Is it possible to make sense or ascribe a description to something completely unperceivable? What would be the reality, nature and configuration of that something in the overall scheme of epistemological pursuit? Conceding that something cannot exist or subsist in the absence of our noticing it would further lead to the question of who creates an object and confers on it an independent objective existence. Regardless of how unique our apprehension of a thing may be, it may not in itself be responsible for the coming about of the apprehended thing, meaning that things are independent of our perception of them.

The question then is, how we come to make any sense of the things that independently exist without our inquiring mind? The existence of things must ultimately be determined by man even where his subjective judgmental capabilities are employed; meaning that they at least in a sense derives their meaning, status and sense from the observing, apprehending and cognizing mind. Subjectivism focuses on the topic of understanding and assigns to the item all apparent or cognized attributes.

The content and the object cannot be identical even though there exists an intimate relation, especially since we cannot deny that the sense data, the constitutive element of the content, acquires its reality and origin from the object sensed. If there is no sensation, no data or content is available. We have to acknowledge this logical fact that the object precedes the data that is ultimately deduced from it.

V. EXAMINING THE NEXUS BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND BEING

By dividing reality into *noumena* and *phenomena*, Kant introduces a new and unique way in finding ground for justification of knowledge. As explained by him reality is at two levels, reality as it is in itself (*noumena*) and reality as it appears to the knower (*phenomena*). Whatever that is contained in the universe and which is what is knowable to us, does not become known as that which exists without the mind that knows it. This implies that the things we think belong in the globe constitute a true portion of our personal knowledge but do not occur apart from that personal knowledge and do not transcend our thoughts. The *noumena* according to Kant is transcendently real, exist in and of itself and neither experienced directly nor indirectly.

According to Kant, *noumena* are classifications of mind and their arrangement lead to phenomenal objects, where they relate to reality. Phenomenal objects do not constitute analogues, copies, representations or anything similar to the *noumena* because the *noumena* causes phenomena but does not resemble them in any way. Kant rightly held that in claiming that the effect can be completely unlike the cause. That is like the mind interacting somehow with *noumena*, but Kant believes that *noumena* is never immediately experienced by the mind.

With the understanding of noumena as reality and phenomena as the world we experience, it must thus be concluded that we never get past our experience to reality as it is in itself. It can also be logically concluded that truth is found in the noumena since that is reality. Postmodernists on their part and to their credit have argued that since we Kant say anything about the noumena, we ought to completely ignore it. Kant asserted the existence of the noumena without offering a justification of its existence. Postmodernists argue that we should just get rid of this extra luggage and concentrate exclusively on what we experience.

The synthetic division of perception and perception itself is so far from comparable with the internal feeling that the latter can be applied preferably to all reasonable intuitions of items and to the many intuitions, by the title of organizations, as the source of all combinations; on the other side, inner meaning includes the pure type of intuition without a total and has no certain intuition and this can only be achieved by knowing the concept of the manifold through the transcendental intervention of fantasy.

Epistemology as we have seen earlier is the study of knowledge, what knowledge is, how it is justified, and what we can know and how. Questions in epistemology include but are not limited to the following: What constitutes knowledge? To which the standard response is knowledge is justified true belief. Is there a certain foundation on which to build our knowledge or is all knowledge relative or uncertain? Do we perceive things as they are (direct realism), some kind of sense-data that is immediately related to how (indirect reality) situations are, or perhaps only mental representations (idealism)? Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a study of what exists as such.

Epistemology seeks to address the question of what we know while metaphysics simply studies all that is as long as existence is affirmed and this does not exclude our own process of knowing. In other words, the application of metaphysics includes all that epistemology studies while the converse is not the case since epistemology on its part is limited in method and scope. As explained in the *Critique*, the synthetic division of perception and perception itself is so far from comparable with the internal feeling that the latter can be applied preferably to all reasonable intuitions of items and to the many intuitions, by the title of organizations, as the source of all combinations; on the other side, inner meaning includes the pure type of intuition without a total and has no certain intuition and this can only be achieved by knowing the concept of the manifold through the transcendental intervention of fantasy.

The perceived or experienced objects of the world arise out of a combination of the data that belong to them alone and our way of representing that data as seen in the categories of time and space which is our way of representing what exists. According to Kant, all the basic metaphysical ideas such as meaning or cause are actually intrinsic in our aspects of arranging knowledge.

Restricting all our possible comprehension to the world of appearances, implies that that which appears and whose basis we then articulate what later becomes part of human knowledge is indeed affirming existence of the known and further confirming its existence and its necessary nexus to knowledge which is only an end product and a beginning of being.

CONCLUSION

This paper philosophically argues that it is impossible to attain knowledge without the existence of the object of knowledge. It concludes that there is an undeniable necessarily relationship between being and any theory of knowledge because any knowledge would always be knowledge of being. Knowledge and being are therefore interrelated and interdependent, and that being on which knowledge depends indeed include the knower or the thinker. The paper focus the possibility of knowledge and its justification beyond the discussion about subject object relationship of the affirmation of the empiricists or rationalists by asserting an equally new and unique approach which is the thesis that all knowledge is always about being.

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- [9] Kant Immanuel, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 194-195. From German text, "Da dieses Verfahren nun eine wirkliche Erkenntnis a priori gibt, die einen sichern und nützlichen Fortgang hat, so erschleicht die Vernunft, ohne es selbst zu merken, unter dieser Vorspiegelung Behauptungen von ganz anderer Art"